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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Secretary Mellon’s proposal for revision of the income-tax law has
been received with so much approval, and its provisions looking to the
reduction of taxes are of such interest that treasury decisions defining
provisions of the present and former laws are likely to be neglected.
However, a decision by District Judge Goddard of the United States
district court, southern district of New York, in the case of Bankers
Trust Company and Frederick H. Pearce, executors, v. Frank K. Bowers,
collector, is one of considerable importance. This case involves the
question of the computation of income tax for less than a twelve months’
period, and Judge Goddard’s findings are in accordance with the treasury
department’s method of determining the tax by multiplying the net income
by twelve and dividing the product by the number of months included in
such period.
The learned court pointed out that this method sometimes results in
inequity to a taxpayer, but in some instances results in a saving of tax to
him. While it is not clear how Judge Goddard could rule otherwise than
he did, in view of the language of the law bearing upon this subject and
other provisions relating thereto, a little contemplation of the subject
causes one to wonder if congress actually intended that a tax should be
paid upon what in many instances is only supposititious income.
Take, for example, a case of a taxpayer whose taxable income was
twenty-five thousand dollars for the month of January; and who died
January 31st. The government’s position would be that because his taxable
income was $25,000 in one month it would have been $300,000 for the
entire year; it would then compute the tax upon the $300,000, which would
subject it to the highest rate of surtax; then it would divide the tax so
found by twelve and the result would be the tax the government would
demand.
To a taxpayer whose income does not flow to him uniformly during
the year this method of computation is based on pure fiction and if the
suggestion be permissible, it would appear in many instances at least that
he would best serve his survivors by dying at the end of his taxable year.
That the government is not always uniformly consistent in urging the
literal interpretation of the language of the law is evidenced by its position
in its cases against Frederick L. Merriam and Henry B. Anderson (Treas
ury decision 3535), wherein it is noted by Justice Sutherland that:
On behalf of the government it is urged that taxation is a prac
tical matter and concerns itself with the substance of the thing
upon which the tax is imposed rather than with legal forms or
expressions.
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It is true, however, that Justice Sutherland did not agree with the quoted
contention and did find:
* * * in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words
employed is most important for such statutes are not to be
extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language
used.
We, therefore, find the taxing officials in one case urging the literal
interpretation of the statutes and in another endeavoring to maintain that
taxation is a practical matter and concerns itself with the substance of
thing to be taxed.
(T. D. 3521—September 26, 1923)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1921—Decision of court.
1. Return of Income for Period of Less than 12 Months—Section
226 (c)—Returns of Income of Decedent and of His Estate
for Year in which He Dies.
When a taxpayer dies during his taxable year, the return of his income
and the return of the income of his estate for the said year are returns
for a period of less than 12 months within the meaning of section 226 (c)
of the revenue act of 1921, and the respective incomes must be placed upon
an annual basis, as required thereby.
2. Section 226 (c)—Constitutionality.
The provisions of section 226 (c) of the revenue act of 1921 requiring
income for a period of less than 12 months to be placed upon an annual
basis do not violate the constitutional requirements of uniformity.
The following decision of the United States district court for the
southern district of New York in the case of Bankers Trust Co. and
Frederick H. Pearce as executors of the last will and testament of John
Glackner, deceased, v. Frank K. Bowers, as collector of internal revenue
for the second district of New York, sustaining the defendant’s motion
for a dismissal of the complaint, is published for the information of
internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Bankers Trust Co., and Frederick H. Pearce, as executors of the last will
and testament of John Glackner, deceased, plaintiffs, v. Frank K.
Bowers, as collector of internal revenue for the second district of New
York, defendant.
(August 13, 1923.)
Goddard, district judge: This is a motion to dismiss a complaint on
the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient for a cause of action. The
complainant alleges two causes of actions to recover federal income taxes
paid by the plaintiffs under protest and duress.
The decedent died a resident of the city, county, and state of New
York on April 4, 1921. On or about March 15, 1922, plaintiffs, as his
executors, filed two income-tax returns, reporting in one return the net
income received by the decedent during the calendar year 1921 and in the
other return the net income received by plaintiffs as said executors during
said calendar year. The first cause of action has to do with the tax paid
upon the basis of the return filed for the decedent. The complaint alleges,
in substance, that the correct tax liability of the decedent for the calendar
year 1921 was $369.44; that the defendant demanded and the plaintiffs
paid on account of said tax liability the sum of $1,560.04; that $1,290.60
of said tax was paid under protest and duress, and a claim for the refund
thereof was subsequently rejected and denied by the commissioner of
internal revenue. The second cause of action relates to the tax paid upon
the basis of the return reporting the net income received by the executors
in 1921. The correct tax liability is alleged as $2,050.27, whereas the
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defendant demanded and the plaintiffs paid the sum of $2,633.85. Of such
amount $583.58 was paid under protest, and a claim for the refund thereof
was subsequently rejected and denied by the commissioner of internal
revenue. The complaint alleges with respect to each cause of action that
the tax demanded was determined and computed in the manner prescribed
in section 226 (c) of the revenue act of 1921 for the computation of the
tax in the case of returns “made for a portion of the calendar year or
for a period of less than 12 months,” whereas plaintiffs claim with respect
to each cause of action that the tax “should be determined and computed
as if the said return was made for a full calendar year.” Judgment is
demanded for the sum representing the difference between the amount of
the taxes computed in the method contended for by the defendant and the
tax liability computed in the method alleged and claimed by the plaintiffs.
The question is whether the taxes should have been determined in the
manner prescribed in section 226 (c) of the revenue act of 1921, which
provided as follows:
(c) In the case of a return for a period of less than one year
the net income shall be placed on an annual basis by multiplying the
amount thereof by twelve and dividing by the number of months
included in such period; and the tax shall be such part of a tax com
puted on such annual basis as the number of months in such period
is of twelve months.
The defendant contends that the returns filed by plaintiffs were such
returns and has determined the tax liability thereunder by—
(1) Multiplying the net income by 12;
(2) Dividing the product so obtained by the number of months and
fraction thereof in the period covered by the return;
(3) Computing the normal and surtax on the quotient; and
(4) Dividing the total tax so computed by 12, and multiplying the
quotient by the number of months and fraction thereof in the period
covered by the return.
The plaintiffs contend that the returns were not returns “for a period
of less than one year,” within the meaning of section 226 (c) and that the
taxes, therefore, should have been computed in the ordinary method pre
scribed for the computation of income taxes.
The questions therefore involved are:
(1) In the first cause of action, is section 226 (c) applicable to returns
filed for decedents;
(2) In the second cause of action, is section 226 (c) applicable to
returns covering income received by the estates of decedents;
(3) If thus applicable, is section 226 (c) constitutional.
The first two questions involve the interpretation of section 226 (c)
of the revenue act of 1921 and because of their similarity, the answer to
one will determine the other.
Section 226 is as follows:
RETURNS FOR A PERIOD OF LESS THAN TWELVE MONTHS.

Sec. 226. (a) That if a taxpayer, with the approval of the com- *
missioner, changes the basis of computing net income from fiscal
year to calendar year a separate return shall be made for the period
between the close of the last fiscal year for which return was made
and the following December 31. If the change is from calendar year
to fiscal year, a separate return shall be made for the period between
the close of the last calendar year for which return was made and
the date designated as the close of the fiscal year. If the change is
from one fiscal year to another fiscal year a separate return shall be
made for the period between the close of the former fiscal year and
the date designated as the close of the new fiscal year.
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(b) In all cases where a separate return is made for a part of a
taxable year, the net income shall be computed on the basis of such
period for which separate return is made, and the tax shall be paid
thereon at the rate for the calendar year in which such period is
included.
(c) In the case of a return for a period of less than one year
the net income shall be placed on an annual basis by multiplying the
amount thereof by twelve and dividing by the number of months
included in such period; and the tax shall be such part of a tax com
puted on such annual basis as the number of months in such period
is of twelve months.
Subdivision (c) is complete in itself; its language and meaning are
clear. The title of the section is “Returns for a period of less than twelve
months.” It refers to tax returns for a period of less than a year. I see
no reason to believe that it is intended to refer only to cases in which
there has been a voluntary change of accounting or cases in which the
commissioner declares the taxable period terminated under section 250 (g).
It is under a heading dealing with returns for a less period than 12 months
and because subdivision (a) refers only to change from calendar to fiscal
year, or change of fiscal year, to say that sections (b) and (c) are limited
to returns that occur from changes of plan of accounting, is to read into
the sections something that is not there. It seems to me merely an orderly
method of uniting under the one title provisions relating to all returns
covering a period of less than a year whatever may be the cause for such
period. Such an interpretation is emphasized by comparing this section
226 with its corresponding section of the revenue act of 1918, section 226,
which reads as follows:
RETURNS WHEN ACCOUNTING PERIOD CHANGED.

Sec. 226. That if a taxpayer, with the approval of the commis
sioner, changes the basis of computing net income from fiscal year
to calendar year a separate return shall be made for the period between
the close of the last fiscal year for which return was made and the
following December thirty-first. If the change is from calendar year
to fiscal year, a separate return shall be made for the period between
the close of the last calendar year for which return was made, and
the date designated as the close of the fiscal year. If the change is
from one fiscal year to another fiscal year a separate return shall be
made for the period between the close of the former fiscal year and
the date designated as the close of the new fiscal year. If a taxpayer
making his first return for income tax keeps his accounts on the basis
of a fiscal year he shall make a separate return for the period between
the beginning of the calendar year in which such fiscal year ends and
the end of such fiscal year.
In all of the above cases the net income shall be computed on the
basis of such period for which separate return is made, and the tax
shall be paid thereon at the rate for the calendar year in which such
period is included; and the credits provided in subdivisions (c) and
(d) of section 216 shall be reduced respectively to amounts which
bear the same ratio to the full credits provided in such subdivisions
as the number of months in such period bears to twelve months.
So that the title and scope of the section has been enlarged. The
only subject dealt with under the earlier act was change of accounting
period, instead of returns for a period of less than 12 months with the
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of the present act. The earlier act con
tained two paragraphs, the first of which was substantially the same as
subdivision (a) of the later act, and the second paragraph which begins
“In all the above cases * *
In the later act, however, section 226,
after prescribing in subdivision (a) the different periods to be covered by
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separate returns in cases where accounting periods are changed, deals in
subdivision (b) and (c) with all cases of separate returns for a period of
less than 12 months. Thus subdivision (b) reads:
In all cases where a separate return is made for a part of a
taxable year * * *.
Subdivision (c) begins:
Inthe case of a return for a period of less than one year * * *
These
changes are significant and indicate an intention to have
section (c) apply to the returns of all incomes for a period of less than
12 months, whether the accounting period is changed or not. Congress
recognized that formerly whenever there was a return covering a frac
tional part of a year the government lost considerable revenue to which it
was equitably entitled. This was due to the fact that the rates of both
normal and surtax were graduated and the rate of tax was necessarily
lower in all cases of returns for a period of less than 12 months than a
rate of tax for a full year. This was just as true in the case of decedents
as in the case of a change in accounting period. The amounts of tax upon
income of part of a year should be less than the amount for a full year,
but equitably both as between the government and the taxpayer and as
between different taxpayers, the rates should be the same in either case.
Section 226 (c) of the revenue act of 1921 secures this desired uniformity
by providing that the net income shall be placed upon an annual basis and
that the tax upon such annual income shall be proportionate to the period
covered by the return. There is another significant addition to the 1918
act by the 1921 act which indicates an intention to apply section 226 (c)
in the manner contended for by the government and that is the addition
of subdivision (f) to section 216. Section 216 (f) of the 1921 act provides
that—
The credits allowed * * * shall be determined by the status
of the taxpayer on the last day of the period for which the return of
income is made; but in the case of an individual who dies during the
taxable year, such credits shall be determined by his status at the time
of his death, and in such case full credits shall be allowed to the
surviving spouse, if any, according to his or her status at the close
of the period for which such survivor makes return of income.
The credits allowed, under the law, against a taxpayer’s net income,
for the purpose of determining his net taxable income, are $1,000 for a
single person and $2,000 to a married person, with an additional amount for
each minor child. The subdivision just quoted allows the full annual
credits. Under section 226 of the act of 1918 full annual credits were
specifically denied, but were to be prorated. The last paragraph of this
section provided, inter alia,
* * * the credits * * * shall be reduced respectively to
amounts which bear the same ratio to the full credits provided in
such subdivisions as the number of months in such period bears to
twelve months.
The full paragraph was omitted in the 1921 act, and, as heretofore
stated, subdivision (f) was added to section 216, thus clearly indicating
that where full annual credits are to be allowed the income against which
these credits are to be taken must be placed on an annual basis. It is
contrary to the theory of the income-tax laws to allow full annual credits
against incomes for less than 12 months unless the incomes are placed
upon an annual basis.
The plaintiffs contend that section 226 (c) does not apply to returns
of decedents or of their estates for the reason that such return is a return
not for a fractional part of a year, but for an entire year. This because
the statute nowhere specifically declares that such a return is a return for
a fractional part of a year and nowhere explicitly requires a separate return
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in case of a decedent and of the income received by his estate. That the
fundamental scheme of title II of the act is that of a tax upon the net
income of a taxpayer during a period of 12 successive months, that the
taxing sections of the act, sections 210 and 211, respectively, impose a
normal and surtax “for each taxable year upon the net income of every
individual.”
That “taxable year,” the term applied to the general accounting
period, is defined in section 200 as follows:
(1) The term “taxable year” means the calendar year, or the
fiscal year ending during such calendar year, upon the basis of which
the net income is computed under section 212 or section 232. The
term “fiscal year” means an accounting period of twelve months
ending on the last day of any month other than December. The first
taxable year, to be called the taxable year 1921, shall be the calendar
year 1921 or any fiscal year ending during the calendar year 1921;—
Section 212, which provides for the basis of computing the net income of
individuals, states:
(b) The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the tax
payer’s annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the
case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer: but if no such method
of accounting has been so employed, or if the method employed does
not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made upon
such basis and in such manner as in the opinion of the commissioner
does clearly reflect the income. If the taxpayer’s annual accounting
period is other than a fiscal year as defined in section 200 or if the
taxpayer has no annual accounting period or does not keep books,
the net income shall be computed on the basis of the calendar year.
(c) If a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal year
to calendar year, from calendar year to fiscal year, or from one fiscal
year to another, the net income shall, with the approval of the com
missioner, be computed on the basis of such new accounting period,
subject to the provisions of section 226.
However, under the prior revenue acts and under these acts the
treasury department has, by regulations which were reasonable and within
the scope of its authority required separate returns of income received by
the decedent during the fractional period prior to death and of income of
the estate during the fractional period from the date of death to the end
of the year. The regulation referred to is article 421 of regulations 45,
and, so far as it is material, reads as follows:
Every fiduciary, * * * must make a return of income (a)
for the individual whose income is in his charge, if the net income
of such individual is $2,000 or over if married and living with hus
band or wife, or is $1,000 or over in other cases, * * *. If the net
income of a decedent from the beginning of the taxable year to the
date of his death was $1,000 or more, if unmarried, or $2,000 or more,
if married, the executor or administrator shall make a return for
such decedent.
When congress enacted the 1921 act it was cognizant of the foregoing
regulation requiring separate returns to be made of the income of de
cedents and the income of their estate, and that in every such instance
there would of necessity be a return for a period of less than 12 months.
Therefore, knowing of this regulation, congress must have intended to
apply section 226 (c) to the income of decedents and their estates.
The class of returns which are under consideration are those which
actually do cover a period which is less than a year and if 226 (c) is to
be regarded meaning just what it says, it must refer to them.
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It is contended that section 226 (c), if construed to be applicable to
returns filed for decedents and their estates, is unconstitutional upon two
grounds:
I. That in operation section 226 (c) would tax as income that which
does not constitute income within the meaning of the sixteenth amend
ment to the constitution, and therefore violates the provisions of article I,
section 2, clause 3, and article I, section 9, clause 4, of the constitution.
It is urged in support of this that to tax decedents and their estates
by multiplying net income by 12 and dividing by the number of months
included in the period covered by the return, has the effect of imposing
a tax based upon a supposititious income and not real income. It is said,
for instance, that this is what happens if section 226 is applied to an indi
vidual whose net income during January is $1,000 and who dies January 31,
that he is being taxed upon a net income of $12,000, $11,000 of which by
no stretch of the imagination would be considered income. The first and
entirely obvious answer to this argument is that he is not being taxed upon
$12,000 for one month, which is his taxable period, but upon $1,000 for
one month; that is to say, he is being taxed upon his actual income for the
part of the year during which he was alive.
It would seem extraordinary for a decedent to be taxed on the basis
of an annual period during part of which he is in his grave. And a con
struction does not seem reasonable which allows to a taxpayer whose
taxable period is less than a year the same credits and exemptions that are
allowed to one whose taxable period covers a full year. It is possible to
conceive some rare instances when the application seems harsh for the
decedent, but, on the other hand, it is possible to conceive instances where
the decedent would benefit. But unfortunately this is true of most tax
laws.
The second ground upon which plaintiffs assert the unconstitutionality
of section 226 (c) is that it is violative of the fifth amendment to the consituation. More particularly that it operates to determine the net income
of decedents by a rule different from that of living persons by denying
the former substantial deductions accorded to the latter and taxing a
decedent a substantially larger amount than a living person on exactly
the same amount of net income.
Under the constitution the general power is given to congress to lay
and collect taxes, but they must be uniform. The rule of uniformity
prescribed is the territorial uniformity required by article I, section 8, of
the constitution (LaBelle Iron Works v. U. S., 256 U. S. 392). The mere
fact that the income of the decedent and the income of his estate are made
subject to the higher rates—surtaxes—does not result in oppressive or
discriminatory taxation such as the constitution forbids. Even though a
statute may operate oppressively upon some taxpayers, or even all, is no
reason for the judicial department to declare the same void. From time
immemorial the imposition of taxes has been a burden and never has that
burden been evenly distributed or equalized, although that is the aim of
political science. Taxing statutes may, and almost always do, operate
more oppressively upon some persons than upon others.
The state of Illinois enacted an inheritance-tax law providing that a
tax of 3 per cent. should be paid by everyone receiving a legacy of $10,000
and a tax of 4 per cent. should be paid by everyone receiving more than
$10,000. An action was instituted to contest the constitutionality of this
statute, the plaintiff contending that the statute was oppressive and unrea
sonable, discriminatory in that a person receiving $10,000 would be com
pelled to pay only $300 as a tax and would receive as his net legacy the
sum of $9,700, while one receiving $10,001 would pay $400.04 and his net
legacy would be $9,600.96, just $99.04 less than the one whose legacy was
actually only one more dollar than the other. In answer to this contention,
the supreme court of the United States in Magoun v. Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank (170 U. S. 283, at p. 300), said:
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If there is unsoundness it must be in the classification. The
members of each class are treated alike, that is to say, all who inherit
$10,000 are treated alike—all who inherit any other sum are treated
alike. There is equality therefore within the classes. If there is inequal
ity it must be because the members of a class are arbitrarily made
such and burdened as such upon no distinctions justifying it. This
is claimed. It is said that the tax is not in proportion to the amount
but varies with the amounts arbitrarily fixed, and hence, that an inheri
tance of $10,000 or less pays 3 per cent., and that one over $10,000
pays not 3 per cent. on $10,000 and an increased percentage on the
excess over $10,000 but an increased percentage on the $10,000 as
well as on the excess, and it is said, as we have seen, that in conse
quence one who is given a legacy of ten thousand and one dollars by
the deduction of the tax receives $99.04 less than one who is given a
legacy of $10,000. But neither case can be said to be contrary to
the rule of equality of the fourteenth amendment. That rule does
not require, as we have seen, exact equality of taxation. It only
requires that the law imposing it shall operate on all alike under the
same circumstances.
If a classification based upon a difference of one dollar in the amount
of income received by taxpayers otherwise similarly situated, is a reasonable
classification, then unquestionably the classification here involved is not
unreasonable.
In the case of Spencer v. Merchant (125 U. S. 345), the court said:
In the words of Chief Justice Chase, condensing what had been said
long before by Chief Justice Marshall, “the judicial department can not
prescribe to the legislative department limitations upon the exercise of
its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be exercised oppressively
upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts,
but to the people by whom its members are elected.”
See also Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. (240 U. S. 103; Billings v.
United States (232 U. S. 261) ; Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co. (220 U. S. 107).
The application of section 226 (c) of the revenue act of 1921 to the
decedent’s income and the income of his estate does not render the act
unconstitutional, although in some instances, placing those incomes upon
an annual basis, as provided by the section, may subject the incomes to the
higher surtaxes. The rates imposed are uniform. Every taxpayer under
the same circumstances pays the same tax and therefore there is no dis
crimination. From the foregoing it can not be questioned that congress
has the power to tax the income of a decedent as well as the income
of his estate, and it may devise any reasonable methods for the compu
tation of those taxes. The method provided by section 226 (c) is reasonable.
The motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.
(T. D. 3535—December 3, 1923)
Income taxes—Act of 1913—Decision of supreme court.
Income Tax—Bequests—Executors' Commissions.
Where a testator bequeaths specific sums to certain persons and in a
subsequent paragraph of the will names such persons as executors and
trustees, and provides that the bequests made are in lieu of all compensa
tion or commissions to which they would otherwise be entitled as execu
tors or trustees, the bequests are not compensation and taxable as income
under section II, A, subdivision I, and B, act of October 3, 1913 (38 Stat.
L. 114, 166).
The appended decision of the supreme court of the United States in
the cases of United States v. Frederick L. Merriam and United States v.
Henry B. Anderson is published for the information of internal-revenue
officers and others concerned.
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United States, petitioner, v. Frederick L. Merriam and United States,
petitioner, v. Henry B. Anderson.
Writs of certiorari to the United States Circuit of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
(November 12, 1923.)
Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the court:
These are actions brought by the United States against the respective
defendants, to recover the amount of additional income taxes assessed
against them under the act of October 3, 1913 (ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166).
The pertinent provisions of the statute are:
A. Subdivision 1. That there shall be levied, assessed, collected,
and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from
all sources in the preceding calendar year to every citizen of the
United States, whether residing at home or abroad, and to every
person residing in the United States, though not a citizen thereof, a
tax of one per centum upon such income * * *.
B. That subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are
hereinafter allowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include
gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensa
tion for personal service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid,
or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales,
or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the
ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property, also from
interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any lawful
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever, including the income from but not
the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
* * *.
The taxes were assessed upon certain legacies bequeathed to the
defendants by the will of the late Alfred G. Vanderbilt. The provisions
of the will which give rise to the controversy are as follows:
Eleventh: I give and bequeath to my brother, Reginald C. Van
dervilt, five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) ; to my uncle, Fred
erick W. Vanderbilt, two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000); to
Frederick M. Davies, five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000); to
Henry B. Anderson, two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000); to
Frederick L. Merriam, two hundred and fifty thousand dollars
($250,000) ; to Charles E. Crocker, ten thousand dollars ($10,000) ;
and to Howard Lockwood, one thousand dollars ($1,000).
*******
Sixteenth. I nominate and appoint my brother, Reginald C.
Vanderbilt, my uncle, Frederick W. Vanderbilt, Henry B. Anderson,
Frederick N. Davies, and Frederick L. Merriam executors of this
my will and trustees of the several trusts created by this my will.
* * * The bequests herein made to my said executors are in lieu
of all compensation or commissions to which they would otherwise
be entitled as executors or trustees.
The defendants qualified as executors and letters testamentary were
duly issued to them prior to the commencement of these actions. The
legacies were received by the respective defendants during the year 1915—
$250,000 by Merriam and $200,000 by Anderson.
Demurrers to the complaints were overruled by the district court and
judgments rendered against defendants. Upon writs of error from the
court of appeals these judgments were reversed (282 Fed. 851). The
government contends that these legacies are compensation for personal
service within the meaning of paragraph B, quoted above.
The cases turn upon the meaning of the phrase which describes net
income as “including the income from but not the value of property
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acquired by * * * bequest. * * *” The word “bequest” is com
monly defined as a gift of personal property by will; but it is not neces
sarily confined to a gratuity. Thus, it was held in Orton v. Orton (3
Keyes (N. Y. 486), that a bequest of personal property, though made in
lieu of dower, was, nevertheless, a legacy, the court saying, “Every bequest
of personal property is a legacy, including as well those made in lieu of
dower and in satisfaction of an indebtedness as those which are wholly
gratuities. The circumstances whether gratuitous or not does not enter
into consideration in the definition. * * * And when it is said that a
legacy is a gift of chattels, the word is not limited in its meaning to a
gratuity, but has the more extended signification, the primary one given
by Worcester in his dictionary, ‘a thing given, either as a gratuity or as a
recompense.’ ”
Without now attempting to formulate a precise definition of the
meaning of the word as used in this statute, or deciding whether it includes
an amount expressly left as compensation for service actually performed,
it is enough for present purposes to say that it does include the bequest
here under consideration, since, as we shall presently show, actual service
as a condition of payment is not required. A bequest to a person as execu
tor is considered as given upon the implied condition that the person named
shall, in good faith, clothe himself with the character.—2 Williams on
Executors (6 Am. Ed.) 1391; Morris v. Kent (2 Eduards Chancery, 175,
179). And this is so whether given to him simply in this capacity or for
care and trouble in executing the office.—Idem. And it is a sufficient
performance of the condition if the executor proves the will or unequiv
ocally manifests an intention to act.—Lewis v. Mathews (L. R. 8 Eq.
Cas. 277, 281) ; Kirkland v. Narramore (105 Mass. 31, 32) ; Scofield v.
St. John (65 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 292, 294-296) ; Morris v. Kent, supra;
Harrison v. Rowley (4 Vesey 212, 215).
In Morris v. Kent, supra (p. 179) it is said:
A legacy to an executor, even expressed to be for care and pains,
is not to be regarded in the light of a debt or as founded in contract,
or to be governed by the principles applicable to contracts. * * *
When a legacy is given to a person in the character of executor, so
as to attach this implied condition to it, the question generally has
been upon the sufficient assumption of the character to entitle the party
to the same. The cases establish the general rule that it will be a
sufficient performance of the condition, if the legatee prove the will
with a bona fide intention to act under it or unequivocally manifest an
intention to act in the executorship, as, for instance, by giving directions
about the funeral of the testator, but is prevented by death from
further performing the duties of his office.
Decisions are cited in the government’s brief which, it is said, establish
a contrary rule. These decisions, however, we are of opinion, are clearly
differentiated from the case under consideration. Some of them are with
reference to testamentary provisions specifically fixing the amount of com
pensation for services to be rendered, while others deal with the question
whether the executor is entitled to receive statutory compensation in
addition to the amount named in the will. In Matter of Tilden (44 Hun.
441), for example, the will directed that: “In lieu of all other commis
sions and compensation to my executors for performing their duties under
this will * * * I authorize them to receive from my estate the fol
lowing commissions, namely:” The court, construing this provision, said:
“The provisions in the will were intended to be as compensation for
services rendered, to be in no respect a gift, but an authority to charge
for their services a certain sum.”
Again, in Richardson v. Richardson (129 N. Y. Supp. 941), the will
was interpreted as directing the payment of compensation. Especial stress
was laid upon the fact that the will did not purport to “give” or “bequeath”
to the executors the amounts fixed, and, adopting the language of the court
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in the Tilden case, it was said that the provisions of the will were intended
as an “authority to ‘charge for their services a certain sum.’ The com
pensation provided by the will is not a legacy and does not abate with the
legacies, but is compensation, carefully determined by the testator and
directed to be paid for the services to be rendered and is therefore to be
paid in full.”
It is obvious that in this class of cases the right depends upon the
actual performance of the service and the amount fixed is in no sense a
legacy but is ,purely compensative.
In Renshaw v. Williams (75 Md. 498) the court held that where a
bequest had been made in lieu of commissions in a sum larger than the
commissions would amount to, it must be treated as full compensation for
the entire administration of the estate by the same person, though part of
it passed through his hands as administrator pendente lite and part as
executor.
In Connolly v. Leonard (114 Me. 29), a devise was made “in lieu of
any payment for services as executor or trustee,” with the provision that
it was so to be accepted and understood. The court held that in view of
this language, the executor was not entitled to commissions in addition to
the property devised.
The foregoing are illustrative of the cases relied upon, and, apart
from some general language, which we are unable to accept as applicable
to the present case, none of them, in principle, are in conflict with the
conclusion we have reached. The distinction to be drawn is between com
pensation fixed by will for services to be rendered by the executor and a
legacy to one upon the implied condition that he shall clothe himself with
the character of executor. In the former case he must perform the service
to earn the compensation. In the latter case he need do no more than in
good faith comply with the condition in order to receive the bequest; and
in that view the further provision that the bequest shall be in lieu of
commissions is, in effect, nothing more than an expression of the testator’s
will that the executor shall not receive statutory allowances for the
services he may render.
The word “bequest” having the judicially settled meaning which we
have stated, we must presume it was used in that sense by congress.—
Kepner v. United States (195 U. S. 100, 124) ; the Abbotsford (98 U. S.
440, 444).
On behalf of the government it is urged that taxation is a practical
matter and concerns itself with the substance of the thing upon which the
tax is imposed rather than with legal forms or expressions. But in statutes
levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most important
for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear
import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must
be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.—Gould v.
Gould (245 U. S. 151, 153). The rule is stated by Lord Cairns in Part
ington v. Attorney General (L. R. 4 H. L. 100, 122) :
I am not at all sure that in a case of this kind—a fiscal case—
form is not amply sufficient; because, as I understand the principle of
all fiscal legislation, it is this: If the person sought to be taxed comes
within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the
hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand,
if the crown, seeking to recover the tax, can not bring the subject
within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently
within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.
In other words, if there be admissible in any statute what is called
an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible
in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the
statute. And see Eidman v. Martinez (184 U. S. 578, 583).
We are of opinion that these bequests are not taxable as income under
the statute, and the judgment below is affirmed.
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